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In a landmark case, the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland on
24 March 2021 declared that the closure of worship places in Scotland was a
disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of religion and freedom of
assembly under article 9(2) and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
This is probably the first successful case in challenging lockdown regulations. Two
previous attempts, in England and Scotland, failed.
This judgment, delivered by Lord Braid, could have consequences for other
European jurisdictions facing similar restrictions, not least in Ireland, where currently
religious services must be held online.
Lord Braid’s judgment is as an example of anxious scrutiny in judicial review of
administrative action in the pandemic context. His consideration of the evidence
concerning closure of worship places strikes as well documented and highly
demanding assessment. Lord Braid’s assessment provides good reasons to
think that the government could have chosen an alternative and less intrusive
measure to curb COVID-19 and prevent the health system from being overwhelmed.
Nevertheless, given the exceptional circumstances in which governments are
crafting their emergency responses to the pandemic, pitching proportionality
assessments as Lord Braid does is concerning. Hence, as a rule of thumb, there
should be a more deferential and institutionally sensitive approach to judicial review
of emergency response measures.
Background
For those new to the Scottish jurisdiction, two points are worth making regarding this
judgment. First, Lord Braid exercised review powers to enforce the rights contained
in the European Convention of Human Rights by means of the Human Rights Act
1998. This UK Parliament’s Act enables individuals to claim judicial protection of
their Convention rights in judicial review proceedings before domestic courts. Public
bodies have a statutory duty to act in compliance with Convention rights. Courts will
review the legality of administrative action on Convention rights grounds, and will
invalidate subordinate legislation made by the UK and devolved executives under
law-making powers provided in primary legislation, if their provisions are in breach of
such rights.
Second, in the UK multi-layered constitution significant policy matters, including
public health, are devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Consequently,
in the COVID-19 context, each government has enjoyed leeway to craft its own legal
response to the pandemic. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 delegated broad law-
making powers for Scottish ministers to issue regulations (a form of subordinate
legislation) to prevent, protect against, control or provide a public health response
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to the pandemic. This includes the imposition of restrictions or requirements on or
in relation to persons, things or premises in the event of a threat to public health.
Exercising these powers, Scottish ministers made the main Scottish lockdown
regulations, namely, The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions and
Requirements) (Local Levels) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. These regulations
provide a five-tier system, which enable a short and localised response, depending
on the prevalence of the virus across Scotland.
The judicial challenge before the Outer House concerned Scottish regulations
that came into force on the 8 January 2021, which amended the abovementioned
lockdown regulations in response to a second wave, prompted by the more
contagious UK variant of the coronavirus. Crucially, the UK saw a dramatic increase
in the death toll by the end of December 2020. Among other measures, these
regulations ordered the closure of worship places in level 4 areas and made it a
criminal offence to use these premises other than for limited purposes, such as
funerals, marriage ceremony or civil partnership registration. This resulted in the
closure of worship places throughout mainland Scotland, both indoors and
outdoors, for assembling with others for the purposes of worship between
January and March 2021.
It is worth mentioning the government repealed the regulations imposing the
abovementioned restrictions on worship on the 24 March 2021, the very same day
of the judgment. This decision followed on the government’s timetable for easing
coronavirus restrictions, published on 16 March 2020, setting the 26 March as
the day when communal worship would resume in a place of worship with up to a
maximum of 50 people.
The judgment
Lord Braid claims that practicing Christian and Catholic Roman religions assembled
with others is of the essence of these religious cults (paras [60]-[[61]); that there
is an interference with the right to manifest religion (art. 9 ECHR) in relation to the
right freedom of assembly (art. 11 ECHR) (para [95]); and that such interference
is disproportionate, as it fails to meet the necessity (paras [104]-[117]) and the
balancing (paras [118]-[126]) tests. Regarding the first point, it is worth noting that
for Lord Braid, online worship and individual prayer are not a substitute to communal
worship. To assess the proportionality of the interference, Lord Braid follows the
four-staged test, as developed in Bank Mellat (No. 2) (see Lord Reed at para 74). In
this case, the government failed to meet the necessity and the balancing tests.
First, according to Lord Braid, there are less intrusive alternative measures that
could have been used without compromising the achievement of the objective.
One problematic aspect of proportionality is that, as a matter of fact, in most cases
there are alternative less intrusive means to achieve the objective. Hence, Courts
are right to qualify the necessity test. The proper question here, as Lord Braid’s
analysis shows, is about the scope for governmental discretion in deciding between
competing alternative measures to achieve the objective.
- 2 -
Lord Braid claims that the analysis shall consider, on the one hand, the significant
weight that should be accorded to the right to manifest religion, and on the other,
that the restrictions are limited, both in breadth and time. Nevertheless, little
consideration is given to the limited nature of the restrictions, and the complex
circumstances of decision-making. Instead, Lord Braid undertakes anxious scrutiny
of government’s justification. Here, he draws on his detailed account of the
government’s decision-making and assessment of three alternative measures (see
paras [25]-[26], [36]-[40], [43]-[45], [47], [55]-[57]). Lord Braid questions the choice
of closure over three alternatives, which were maintaining the status quo, reducing
the maximum number of people attending places of worship from 50 to 20 people,
and permitting individual prayer at worship places. He goes on to suggest that the
number of people attending worship in governmental assessments is factually wrong
(para [113]). Lord Braid also notes that the data suggest that, of all the activities
undertaken by infected people in the week commencing on the 20 December
2020, among the ones which had the lowest incidence was worship and prayer.
He also highlights that there has been only one small outbreak of COVID church
incident recorded so far. Relying on this data, he goes confidently on to question
evidence for not adopting a less restrictive measure, including remarks made by
Professor Jason Leitch, the Clinical Director of Healthcare Quality and Strategy at
the Scottish government, which are subject to detailed criticism (see para [112]).
Lord Braid also relies on the fact that other activities which pose a similar or higher
risk to public health are being permitted, which suggests that meeting indoors can
be safe if appropriate measures are taken (para [114]). In sum, Lord Braid thinks
that a carefully crafted authorisation to operate worship places with limited capacity
and guidance on appropriate preventive measures would have achieved the same
objective, and minimal interference to the right to manifest religion.
Whilst necessity test failure led to a breach of Convention rights, Lord Braid goes
on to perform the balancing test at paras [118]-[126]. He also concludes that the
measure fails this test, as closure of worship places amounts to a disproportionate
interference. He claims that risk of transmission in these places is low, which
suggest that closure of worship places makes a small contribution to the aim of
curtailing risk transmission and avoiding the NHS being overwhelmed (para [119]
and [123]). On the other hand, Lord Braid thought that the government downplayed
the significance of the right to manifest religion appears under-played. Furthermore,
in his view, the measures amount to a significant interference, since they extended
for 11 weeks in circumstances that there are no substitutes to communal worship,
and infringement amounts to a criminal offence. Finally, Lord Braid claims that
the decision is disproportionate because it involves a blanket ban on all forms of
worship, including private prayer, communion, confession and baptism.
Concluding remarks
Lord Braid’s judgment strikes for its detailed scrutiny of processes of governmental
decision-making, and for his critical assessment of the government’s justification for
closure of worship places. In that sense, Lord Braid’s judgment is a good reminder
that empirical evidence is at the heart of proportionality testing. Nevertheless, insofar
as the necessity and balancing test are concerned, normative considerations about
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institutional competence also come into play. At this point, significant aspects of
the government’s decision making are missing due to Lord Braid’s anxious scrutiny
of the evidence. There was deliberation at the Scottish government despite the
circumstances, various layers of interactions and discussions between civil servants,
politicians and experts, a significant process of evidence gathering, ongoing
processes of political accountability, and crucially, consultation on a weekly basis
with representatives of faiths and religious congregations.
Perhaps the evidence upon which the government relied to provide the closure of
worship places was thin, and Lord Braid got it right. Nevertheless, arguably, his
judgment makes for an uncomfortable reading in the current circumstances, not
least since the pandemic is a text-book example of cases where court may defer
to the executive on grounds of expertise and institutional competence. Lord Braid’s
questioning of the government is compelling, no doubt about it. The question that
arises is whether it is right for a judge to pitch proportionality assessments at this
level. When thinking about this question, it is worth bearing in mind that governments
are taking and reviewing their decisions on a weekly basis, within constrained
timeframes, relying on imperfect information and modelling, dealing with the ever-
evolving nature of the coronavirus, and crucially, having to send a simple, clear and
coherent overall message to the population. It seems inevitable that various aspects
of the pandemic response rely on thin evidence, and may be susceptible of judicial
challenge.
Against this background, Lord Braid’s judgment leaves us with a question: what
would happen if anxious scrutiny in reviewing the legality of emergency responses
to the pandemic were the rule, rather than the exception? Herculean judges may
visit us from time to time, rightly so, but if they settle at these troubling times,
government’s responses to the pandemic would grind to a halt.
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